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INSURANCE ASPECTS OF PARTS AND SERVICE
CONTRACTS: PROBLEMS FACING THE
TELEVISION INDUSTRY
The following press release recently appeared in a trade journal:
"Instances have been brought to the attention of the New Hamp-
shire Insurance Department which indicate that certain concerns which
distribute appliances, deep freezers, television sets and air conditioning
units and which offer service contracts in connection with such goods
are in fact engaged in the sale of insurance without complying with
the insurance licensing laws of the state. Any contract made by serv-
ice concerns which agrees to replace certain parts upon the happening
of a contingency can be construed as a contract of insurance. The
assumption of a hazard or risk in such a contract involves the elements
of insurance.
"Properly worded warranty agreements given by the vendor at the
time of sale and guarantees given by the manufacturer are not insur-
ance, but some service contracts even though they may be labelled con-
tracts of warranty or guaranty do include the elements of insurance.
An illustration in the television field is those service contracts issued
by independent service companies which agree to replace the tubes in
a set on the happening of a contingency. If not properly licensed and
supervised, the action of these service companies can and in some
cases does result in a fleecing of the public. Such concerns are warned
that the issuance of such contracts without being licensed is illegal and
the public is advised to exercise caution in accepting service con-
tracts." 1
This release illustrates the problems currently facing the profession
because of the recent innovation into the commercial world of the service
contract. This Note will discuss the questions raised for the lawyer, the
courts, and the state insurance commissioners by this new selling device,
2
using the television service contract as an example.3
1. Retailing Daily, July 31, 1952.
2. It has been used extensively only since 1938.
3. The main terms of a typical contract are: "X Co. will service and maintain
the X Co. television receiver and antenna to which this contract relates, in normal
working order, during the term of this contract, provided that such service and
maintenance are necessitated by normal usage as determined by X Co. If materials,
parts and tubes fail to give satisfactory performance in normal usage, genuine factory
replacements will be furnished during this term." These contracts generally run
for one year and are subject to renewal.
(243)
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Warranties for many years have played an important part in the mer-
chandising field, but they have not proven wholly satisfactory to either
the seller or the consumer.4 The seller usually faces a customer who insists
that the damage to or the inefficient running of the product is due to a
material defect for which the manufacturer is responsible. If the warranty
has expired, or the damage may be attributable to the customer's abuse of
the product, ill-will instead of good-will results. Conversely, the customer
generally finds that the waranty is f.o.b. factory, thereby requiring him or
a paid technician to extract the defective part and ship it, at his own expense,
to the factory. There his claim is seldom handled promptly or properly.
If litigation develops the customer finds himself less efficiently represented
than his corporate vendor. In addition, the present day manufacturer and
customer are engaged in selling and buying appliances which are highly
technical in construction. The maintenance of these appliances requires
skilled service men who are not readily available.8 Since this is especially
true when a new product appears on the market, its manufacturer is met
with substantial sales resistance.6 Because of these motivating factors,
manufacturers, dealers and independent service companies have been offer-
ing, at an additional price, a service contract to supplement the traditional
ninety day warranty. The service contract may cover the replacement of
parts for a period of time in addition to the warranty, the cost of labor
to replace the parts, or both.
7
PROBLEMS OF DRAFTSMANSHIP
The biggest problem for the draftsman is how to make sure that his con-
tract will not be classified as an "insurance contract." If this is inadver-
tently created, the seller would have to incorporate as an insurance company
and thereby subject himself to the elaborate regulations, including a large
paid-in capital 8 and unearned premium reserves, which the various state
insurance statutes and commissioners impose. A failure to incorporate in
compliance with these statutes would subject the person or corporation to
quo warranto proceedings at the will of his competitors. 9 A conviction
would result in large criminal penalties.' 0
4. See 11 ADVERTISiNG AGE 8 (July 18, 1938).
5. See How TV Racketeers Gyp You, 60 READER's DIGEST 103, 104 (June,
1952), where it is estimated that it costs $1500 to train a competent television repair-
man, and $1800 to equip a service organization.
6. Mr. Herbert Brunn, Assistant-General Attorney of Radio Corporation of
America (RCA Victor Division) stated in an interview (Sept. 20, 1952) that in-
suring the public's confidence in this new invention was a primary factor in the
company's decision to set up television service facilities on a national basis.
7. An evil has occurred when a dealer or service man sells only a contract to
replace parts for a nominal sum and then charges exorbitant fees for his labor.
8. E.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 44.214 (1943) ($50,000 paid in capital); N.Y. INs.
LAw §311 ($100,000 paid in capital); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §24.213 (Moore 1943)
($200,000 paid in capital).
9. See 23 MARQTE L. Rsv. 91 (1939).
10. E.g., OIalO GEN. CODE ANN. §672 (Page 1937) (Maximum of $1000 fine
for each offense and/or maximum of 6 months imprisonment) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
40, §47 (Purdon 1930) ($500 for each month or fraction thereof, in which said
illegal business was transacted); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 48A, § 67 (Flack
1939) ($100-$1000 fine for each offense).
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Statutory and Common Law Themes.-State insurance statutes give
little help in determining what constitutes a contract of insurance since they
either define insurance in broad and useless terms 11 or give no definition
at all.12 One of the most generally accepted definitions of insurance is that
given in a Massachusetts case, 13 where the court stated that a contract of
insurance is an agreement by which one party, for a consideration, promises
to make a certain payment of money upon the destruction of or injury to
something in which the other party has an interest. Neither the amounts
of payment by the assured nor the modes of ascertaining or securing the
payment of the sum to be paid by the insurer affect the question of whether
the agreement between them is a contract of insurance. The only requisites
to such a contract are the payment of consideration by the one and the
promise by the other to pay the amount of the insurance upon the happening
of injury to the subject, caused by a contingency contemplated in the con-
tract. 14 This definition, like most statutory definitions, is broad enough to
include almost any contract in which one party assumes another's risk. One
writer has listed five elements for the existence of a contract of insurance.
They are: "(a) The insured possesses an interest of some kind susceptible
of pecuniary estimation, known as an insurable interest. (b) The insured
is subject to a risk of loss through the destruction or impairment of that
interest by the happening of designated perils. (c) The insurer assumes
that risk of loss. (d) Such assumption is part of a general scheme to dis-
tribute actual losses among a large group of persons bearing somewhat
similar risks. (e) As consideration for the insurer's promise, the insured
makes a ratable contribution, called a premium, to a general insurance
fund." 15 He explains that a warranty contains the first three, but a con-
tract of insurance contains all five. Although this is undoubtedly correct,
(d) and (e) contain the words "general scheme" and a "general insurance
fund" which are of as little help as the broad definitions found in an insur-
ance statute. Does the nature of the contract depend upon whether the
parties intended to engage in the insurance business; upon whether a sum
of money is separated from the corporate assets and labeled insurance fund;
upon whether the contract is sold separately from the product; upon the
length of time the contract is to be effective; upon whether the indemnity
is to be made in money rather than services; upon the nature of the for-
11. E.g., Ky. RFsv. STAT. § 304.002 (Supp. 1950) ("Insurance is a contract
whereby one undertakes to indemnify another or pay a specified amount upon de-
terminable contingencies."); MD. ANN. CoDE GEN. LAws art. 48A, § 1 (Flack 1939)
("Insurance business, or business of insurance means and embraces . . . an obliga-
tion or undertaking of any kind or nature whatsoever insuring against or under-
taking to indemnify any person for loss resulting from any contingency, hazard or
casualty.").
12. E.g., Ill., Pa., and Mich.
13. Commonwealth v. Wetherbee, 105 Mass. 149 (1870).
14. This was codified in MAss. GFx. LAws c. 175, § 2 which states: "A contract
of insurance is an agreement by which one party for a consideration promises to
pay money or its equivalent, or to do an act valuable to the insured, upon the de-
struction, loss or injury of something in which the other party has an interest."
15. VANc , INSURANcE 1 (3d ed. 1951)(
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tuitous contingencies for which the replacement of parts or services are to
be rendered; or upon whether an independent service man, a dealer or a
manufacturer makes the contract? These questions remain unanswered by
the definitions of insurance. Traditionally the lawyer would look to the
courts for guidance in their answers, but the courts have been as indefinite
in their "definitions" of insurance as the statutes. 16
Judicial Undertones.-A typical service contract indemnifies against
both replacement of parts and incidental labor costs. Each of these raises
different problems which will be discussed separately.
(a) Scope of a Contract of Warranty of Parts.-This problem may
again be subdivided into the different considerations involved when war-
ranties are offered by (1) a manufacturer or dealer, or (2) an independent
service man. No cases have been decided involving an independent service
man giving only a warranty on another's goods, but his inability to do so
without engaging in the insurance business will become apparent from the
following decisions.
The earliest case of a manufacturer attempting to offer something more
than a warranty of quality is Cole Brothers & Hart v. Haven.'7 There,
a lightning-rod dealer, in order to promote sales of that new product,'3
promised to pay all damages up to $500 caused by lightning to the structure
upon which the rods were erected. The Iowa court held, in a suit by the
manufacturer against a debtor-purchaser, that the contract was not one of
insurance stating, "One may sell goods and agree that the purchaser will
receive certain benefits or advantages. Such a contract would be a guaranty
or warranty and not a contract of insurance." 19 Here the court looked to
the intent of the parties and found that the main purpose of the contract
was the sale of lightning-rods. The benefit to the purchaser of having the
manufacturer pay for any damage caused by lightning was declared to be
incidental to the inducement to purchase.
This "contingent incidental benefit test" was applied in later cases in
other jurisdictions,20 but a counteracting test was also being developed. In
Ollendorf Watch Co. v. Pink,21 a manufacturer of watches issued, with
each watch sold, a certificate under which he promised to replace the watch
16. Most of the case law has involved enterprising businessmen attempting to
sell a new product.
17. 7 N.W. 383 (Iowa 1880).
18. Lightning-rods were first used to protect buildings in 1876. 14 ENCYcLO-
PAEDIA BRITANNICA 116 (14th ed. 1929).
19. Cole v. Haven, 7 N.W. 383, 384 (Iowa 1880).
20. Evans & Tate v. Premier Refining Co., 31 Ga. App. 303, 120 S.E. 553
(1923) (agreement by seller of oil to replace gears in automobiles if they wear
out while using said oil held to be a contract of warranty); Lamson Consolidated
Store-Service Co. v. Conyngham, 11 Misc. 428, 32 N.Y. Supp. 129 (1898) (agreement
to keep cash register in repair from ordinary wear and tear for 2 years free of
charge held to be a contract of warranty). In both cases a relatively new product
was involved, automobiles becoming popular in early twenties and cash registers
being invented in 1879.
21. 279 N.Y. 32, 17 N.E.2d 676 (1938).
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with a new one of like quality provided the first should be lost in the United
States or Canada through burglary or robbery within one year of purchase.
The lower court, in construing the Massachusetts common law definition of
insurance,2 2 applied the "contingent incidental benefit test" and refused
to interfere with a "modern businessman's new venture." 23 The Court
of Appeals of New York reversed, stating that since theft was not an occur-
rence within the control of the party promising the indemnity it could not
be construed as a contract of warranty. By this decision the court limited
the scope of the warranty to quality and title, those being the only things
within the control of the promisor.
In the same year an Ohio case extended the control test. In State
ex rel. Duffy v. Western Auto Supply Co.24 a seller of automobile tires
guaranteed them for a given period against "blowouts, cuts, bruises, rim
cuts, underinflation, wheels out of alignment, faulty brakes or other road
hazards (except fire or theft)." This contract was held to be one "sub-
stantially amounting to insurance," therefore requiring compliance with the
insurance statutes of the state of Ohio. This decision has been criticised
as an unnecessary interference with a businessman's selling device.2' Cer-
tainly it seems difficult to hold that a manufacturer who warrants his tires
to be so well constructed that nothing can harm them is engaged in the
insurance business.
Three years later the same court, in State ex rel. Herbert v. Standard
Oil Co.,28 retreated from its former position. Here a manufacturer of tires
assured repairs or replacements of its tires if they failed ". . . to give the
purchaser satisfactory service under the usual conditions of wear and
tear. . . ." The court held that the tire manufacturer was not engaging
in the insurance business. This case can be distinguished from the Duffy
case, in that there the loss insured against resulted from risks which in-
cluded those unrelated to defects in the article itself, while here the loss
insured against resulted from faulty construction of the tires. However,
several aspects of the case are worthy of note. (1) Evidence that the manu-
facturer had replaced tires cut from curbs and broken bottles was excluded.
This would have shown what meaning was given by the parties to the
words "usual conditions of wear and tear." (2) The court suggested the
enactment of remedial legislation to deal with the problem directly. (3) The
court stated that the insurance laws were not intended to apply to purely
commercial transactions in the merchandizing field, thereby leaning towards
the "contingent incidental benefit" theory. (4) The court suggested that
the rule of the Duffy case should not be extended.
From these cases one can make certain generalizations. The lawyer
should advise his manufacturer-client to restrict his assumption of risk to
22. The New York statute contained no definition of insurance; hence the court
turned to the well-developed Massachusetts law. See note 14 supra.
23. The lower court felt it was merely a new selling device.
24. 134 Ohio St. 163, 16 N.E.2d 256 (1938).
25. 48 YAi L.J. 117 (1938).
26. 138 Ohio St. 376, 35 N.E.2d 437 (1941).
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those deficiencies which arise from material defects caused by poor work-
manship. The use of the words "to replace parts which become defective
through the normal use of the product" is advisable. No obligation should
be assumed for consequential damage 27 or for nprmal wear. If the cover-
age is extended to all contingencies except fire, theft, lightning and the like,
the fate of the contract will be in the court's discretion. A commercially
wise court would apply the "contingent incidental benefit" theory, but there
is no sufficient trend in any jurisdiction upon which a lawyer can rely.
If extended coverage is desired, the contract should be so worded that it
appears that the product is made to withstand all damage from the specified
contingencies, and that all loss is the result of poor workmanship. A con-
tract covering all contingencies including acts of God will most certainly
be held a contract of insurance.
The length of time the contract is to run should be limited to the period
of time in which defects caused by faulty construction normally appear. A
renewal of a warranty against defects caused by faulty workmanship may
also bring into play the "control test," since the court may declare that there
is no better indication of the proper period of time a warranty may run
than that period put upon it by the maker's or seller's original assumption
of responsibility at the time of and as part of the original sale.28 A further
defect inherent in a renewal contract is that it is not entered into at the
time of the original sale, and thus the "contigent incidental benefit test"
may not be used to militate against the result of insurance.29
If possible, the price of the warranty should be included in the list price
of every article sold.30 If for business reasons it must be made optional
and the price stated separately, the client should charge a flat rate. To
avert the possibility that assumption of the risk will be held to be the con-
sideration for the premium, it would be advisable to word the consideration
in the form of a waiver of the disclaimer for material defects which occur
after the traditional warranty period. However, the separate pricing factor
logically should have little bearing on the nature of the contract, since even
without separate pricing all warranties are paid for by the customer
through their inclusion in the retail price of the product.
Since a dealer exercises choice as to the product he will sell, his as-
sumption of responsibility for its quality and efficiency is as great as that
of a manufacturer. Through this ability to select, the dealer is deemed to
have control over the defects which arise from poor workmanship.8 1 There-
27. Although the law may impose liability for consequential damage upon the
seller, liability is still extended by the use of this phrase since the buyer does
not have to prove negligence.
28. See REP. Arr'y GEN. 153 (N.Y. 1949).
29. Since the "contingent incidental benefit" theory was developed to allow a
seller to make his product more attractive, it can be argued that a renewal feature
in a contract sold with the product also accomplishes this and the test should apply.
30. See Commonwealth ex rel. Hensel v. Provident Bicycle Assoc., 178 Pa. 636,
36 Atl. 197 (1897).
31. Although this is not true in practice, this doctrine has become well engrained
in sales law. See Jones v. Just, L.R. 3 Q.B. 197 (1868); Bonenberger v. Pitts-
burgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (1942) ; 1 Wn.usoN, SAMES §233
(2d ed. 1948).
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fore the same type of contract may be drafted for the dealer-client as for
the manufacturer-client.
8 2
Finally, it can be inferred from the above cases that an independent
service nan, having no relation to the selling of the product for which he
contracts to replace parts upon a certain contingency, unrelated to any work
he may have previously performed upon the product, would be engaged in
the insurance business.3 2 a The contract would not meet the control test
which the courts have frequently applied. On the other hand, if he war-
rants parts which he himself has replaced, his position is analogous to that
of a dealer and the same considerations should apply. If he warrants his
own services, he is analogous to a manufacturer. Whether he may contract
to replace parts that wear out due to his lack of care or faulty repair of the
product will be discussed in the following sub-section.
(b) Scope of a Contract for Future Services.-The problem becomes
more complicated when the client wishes to contract not only to replace
parts but also to keep the article in working condition and repair it when
needed. A man may clearly bind himself to perform services in the future;
however, an insurance problem arises if the rendering of those services is
dependent upon a fortuitous event and results in shifting of a risk.a3
A manufacturer or dealer who promises to furnish labor to replace a
part which becomes defective due to faulty workmanship within a period
of time in which the fault would normally appear is not engaging in the
insurance business, since the contingency was within his control; neither
is an independent service man who limits the coverage of the contract for
prepaid future services to machines he has previously repaired and to con-
tingencies attributable to such prior repair work. When a manufacturer
or dealer extends the coverage to include contingencies beyond his control,
or when an independent service man contracts to do future work for a pre-
paid sum, such work to be rendered on the happening of a specified con-
tingency unrelated to any previous work performed by him, the courts have
32. See REP. ATT'y GEN. 153 (N.Y. 1949).
32a. Ibid. The following analysis was stated in a communication to the UNI-
vERsrry OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REvlmV from Mervin R. Samuel, California Deputy
Insurance Commissioner (Nov. 6, 1952), on file, Biddle Law Library, University
of Pennsylvania Law School:
"This Department's approach to the problem Las been on the following basis:
If a television warranty is reasonably related to a guaranty of the product and the
warranty is given by the manufacturer or by the dealer to a person to whom such
manufacturer or dealer sells a television set, it is probably more in the nature of a
guaranty than insurance and probably would not be subject to insurance laws. If,
on the other hand, a person who is not a manufacturer or a dealer who has made
the original sale of the television set to a customer, it is doubtful that he could
properly warrant it. If he should enter into a television warranty contract, it is
probable that he would be acting as an insurer."
33. The risk-shifting factor is necessary. It is illustrable by the following
hypothetical cases: (1) if X promised to put a new roof on Y's house if Y's son
married X's daughter on the twenty-third of June, no element of risk-shifting is
involved; but (2) if X promised to put a new roof on Y's house any time it was
damaged by storm if Y's son married X's daughter on the twenty-third of June,
a risk is shifted from Y to X.
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split on whether he is engaging in insurance business. Positing a shift in
risk, the following tests have been applied:
(1) An absence of a promise to pay money as indemnity for the loss
indicates that the contract is not one of insurance.-Thus in Commonwealth
ex rel. Hensel v. Provident Bicycle Ass'n 34 it was determined by the court
that a bicycle association which, for an agreed annual membership fee,
promised to clean a member's bicycle twice a year, to repair it if damaged
by accident, and to replace it if stolen, was not engaged in the insurance
business. An important factor influencing the court's decision was the fact
that the bicycle owners received no money upon the happening of the
fortuitous event. Other courts have rejected this as a distinguishing factor
even where state statutes fail to define insurance, or define it as payment
by the promisor in money.3 5
(2) Operation in a limited area and with a somewhat limited clientele
may indicate that the contract is not one of insurance.-In Moresh v.
O'Regan,36 the court decided that a contract in which petitioner for a stipu-
lated sum agreed to repair store-front plate glass by tightening the bars or
clamps holding it in place and to replace any such glass which was broken
at any time in the future, was not a contract of insurance under the New
Jersey statutes. In this case, the court took cognizance of the fact that the
promisor operated in a limited area with a limited clientele, negating a need
for public regulation. An opposite conclusion was reached in People v.
Standard Plate Glass and Salvage Co. 3 7 where an agreement to inspect
and putty glass during the period of the contract and to replace the glass
in case it should become broken was held to be a contract of insurance in
evasion of the New York insurance statutes.
3 8
(3) Performance of the services by other than the promisor indicates
that the contract is one of insurance.-Physicians' Defense Co. v. Cooper 39
held that an organization which agreed to provide attorneys for defense
of malpractice suits against physicians was engaging in the insurance busi-
ness. The court stated, "Such a contract, in our opinion, cannot be classed
as a contract for personal services. The company is not itself a lawyer, and
does not undertake the defense as such. What it does undertake . . . is
to employ a local attorney who . . . will defend the case ... ." 40
Since the primary purpose of insurance is to gain protection rather than the
work of a specific person, this distinction has some merit.
34. 178 Pa. 636, 36 Atl. 197 (1897).
35. E.g., State v. Bean, 193 Minn. 113, 258 N.W. 18 (1934); National Auto
Service Corp. v. State, 55 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
36. 120 N.J. Eq. 534, 187 Ati. 619 (1936) (later reversed on another ground).
37. 174 App. Div. 501, 156 N.Y. Supp. 1012 (1916).
38. Accord, People v. Roschli, 275 N.Y. 26, 9 N.E.2d 763 (1937).
39. 199 Fed. 576 (9th Cir. 1912).
40. Id. at 578. Contra: Vredenburgh v. Physicians' Defense Co., 126 Ill. App.
509 (1906).
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(4) A flat rate as opposed to a graduated rate in accordance with the
risk involved is an indication that the contract is not one of insurance.
41
(5) Uniqueness of the service contracted for is an indication that the
contract is not one of insurance.A---This is a corollary to the test of whether
the promisor performs the services himself. Uniqueness or lack of it is
not conclusive as to whether the service was the thing contracted for, as
distinguished from a mere intent to shift the risk, but it tends to throw
light upon the intent 43 of the parties.
It should be understood that none of the above tests is conclusive. As
soon as a contract for future services is made contingent upon the happening
of a fortuitous event, it is capable of qualifying under the broad definitions
of insurance. It should be noted that in the above cases, the contracts were
risk-shifting devices, and, as they were combined with other contracts of
like nature, they became risk distributing devices. Therefore, if a client
wishes to make his services available for a stated period of time, for a pre-
paid sum or even gratuitously, such services to be given on the happening
of certain fortuitous events, which results in risk-shifting, a lawyer cannot
guarantee that he will not be engaging in the insurance business under most
state statutes. Here again, commercially wise courts have kept before them
the purposes of regulation and the purpose of the contract. If they found
possibility of fraud or an attempt to evade the insurance laws the contract
was declared to be one of insurance.44
If a client wishes to take the chance, the following points should be con-
sidered, in addition to restricting his clientele and territory, doing the work
himself, and charging a flat rate:
(1) A dealer should not charge separately for the service contract, but
should include it in the price of the article if economically possible.4 4a
Although this factor by itself is unimportant, together with the others it
may have a great psychological effect on a court's decision as to whether a
man is merely giving an incidental benefit to his purchasers rather then
receiving money for a risk which he has assumed and distributed.
41. Commonwealth ex rel. Hensel v. Provident Bicycle Assoc., 178 Pa. 636, 36
Ati. 197 (1897). This seems a tenuous ground at best since the lack of apportion-
ment may be due to bad business practice.
42. Allin v. Motorists' Alliance, 234 Ky. 714, 29 S.W.2d 19 (1930); Physicians'
Defense Co. v. O'Brien, 100 Minn. 490, 111 N.W. 396 (1907).
43. "Intent" as here used is not the "contractual intent" but "intent" as shown
by the main purpose of the contract.
44. E.g., State ex rel. Coleman v. Wichita Mut. Burial Assoc., 73 Kan. 179,
84 Pac. 757 (1906); Renschler v. Hogan, 90 Ohio St. 363, 107 N.E. 758 (1914);
State v. Globe Casket and Undertaking Co., 82 Wash. 124, 143 Pac. 878 (1914).
44a. A manufacturer attempting to do the same thing might be said to be vio-
lating the prohibition against "tie-in" sales provisions under § 3 of the Clayton Act.
38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1946). Cf. Stanley Co. of America v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 4 F. Supp. 80 (D. Del. 1933) ; General Talking Picture Corp. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 18 F. Supp. 650 (D. Del. 1937). He might likewise
find himself guilty of an unfair method of competition in attempting to control the
service business. Federal Trade Commission Act, 37 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §45(a) (1946).
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(2) A manufacturer or dealer should not sell a service contract to re-
pair products which he does not manufacture or sell.
(3) In the case of a manufacturer or dealer, the period of time for
which the services are made available should be limited to that time in
which the defects in workmanship normally appear. A renewal is as dan-
gerous here as in a warranty against material defects.
(4) The contingencies should never be extended to include such
fortuitous events as fire, theft or other external causes.
(5) Neither the manufacturer, dealer nor independent service man
should assume the obligation to indemnify for consequential damage.45
Administrative Interpretations.-Since 1941, only one judicial decision
has been rendered in this area.48 This would seem to indicate that manu-
facturers, dealers and independent service men had abandoned their at-
tempts to utilize this new selling device. But this is not the case. Oil
burner dealers, automobile dealers, garage service men, elevator manufac-
turers, refrigerator and air conditioner manufacturers, a television manu-
facturer,47 television dealers and independent television service companies
have been selling contracts to replace parts and furnish services. Whether
these contracts bring the promisor within the insurance laws is currently
troubling the various attorneys general and insurance commissioners. A
survey of the forty-eight commissioners has been undertaken. Forty
replies were received, including three rulings of attorneys general, eight
commissioners' opinions previously made public, and twelve commissioners'
opinions given solely in reply to the following two questions:
(1) Question: Is a manufacturer or dealer who enters into a contract
with the public whereby he agrees for a stipulated time to maintain the
product in workable order and to replace parts, engaging in the insurance
business? Out of a total of 23 answers, two stated he was 48 and 21 stated
he was not.4 9 Five of these 20 qualified their opinion by indicating that a
renewal of such a contract would be considered insurance.5 0
45. See note 27 supra.
46. Transportation Guarantee Co. v. Jellins, 29 Cal. 2d 242, 174 P.2d 625 (1946)
(where the company agreed for a stated consideration to keep the owner's trucks
in repair, furnish oil, gas, grease, etc., and to make good any damage due to collision,
the agreement was held a service contract).
47. Radio Corporation of America.
48. Md. (Commissioner has requested an Attorney's General ruling), Fla. (also
requested an Attorney's General ruling).
49. Cal., Colo., Conn. (Attorney's General ruling of July 7, 1950), Del., Ill., Ind.,
Iowa (speech given by Samuel E. Orebaugh, Deputy Comm'r, at the Zone 4 Meet-
ing of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, May 8, 1952), Ky.,
La., Mass., Mich., Minn. (Attorney's General ruling of June 17, 1952), Mo., Nev.,
N.H. (press release, Retailing Daily, July 31, 1952), N.Y. [REP. Arr'y GzN. 153
(N.Y. 1949)], Tenn. and W. Va. Three other states requested that their answers
remain confidential.
50. Ill., Minn. (Attorney's General ruling of June 17, 1952), N.Y. [REP. Ar'y
GEN. 153 (N.Y. 1949)] and Tenn. One state requested that its answer remain con-
fidential.
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(2) Question: Is an independent contractor, who for a consideration
enters into a contract with the public whereby he agrees for a stipulated
time to maintain the product in workable order and to replace parts, en-
gaging in the insurance business? Out of 24 answers, 15 stated he was 5 '
and nine stated he was not.
5 2
Since the insurance statutes make regulation mandatory if the busi-
ness is classified as insurance, the draftsman should consult the ruling of the
attorney general of the state in which his client desires to do business. If
there is no adverse ruling from this source, a consultation with the insur-
ance commissioner may prove fruitful in terms of avoiding at the drafting
stage possible problems.
INVITATIONS TO LIBERALISM
Strict construction of the insurance statutes is commendable in any
case where the main purpose of the contract is to spread risks, but not
where the risk spreading device is incidental to the business in which the
promisor is engaged. A manufacturer or dealer should be encouraged to
stand behind the product which he sells. An attempt to do this in a more
efficient manner than a warranty permits should not be stifled by a technical
construction of the insurance laws. 53 The "contingent incidental benefit"
theory could relieve the harshness of the statutory regulations and better
serve the public interest. Even if a court finds that the "guaranty" is
technically an agreement to insure, it is not . necessary consequence that
the insurance statutes should apply,54 since the legislative mandate is gen-
erally not clear,5 5 and the factors which motivated the passage of the statutes
do not exist here.56
If the manufacturer or dealer is not willing to assume the responsibility
for maintaining his product in an efficient order, is there any reason why an
51. Cal., Conn. (Attorney's General ruling of July 7, 1950), Fla. (Attorney's
General ruling of May 22, 1950 on a similar contract), Ill., Iowa (Speech given by
Samuel E. Orebaugh, Deputy Comm'r, at the Zone 4 Meeting of the National As-
sociation of Ins. Commissioners, May 8, 1952), Ky., Mass., Md., Minn. (Attorney's
General ruling of June 17, 1952), Mo., Neb., N.H. (press release, Retailing Daily,
July 31, 1952), N.Y. [REP. Ar'Y GEN. 153 (N.Y. 1949)], Tenn. and W. Va.
52. Colo., Del., Ind., La., Mich., and Nev. Three other states requested that
their answers remain confidential.
53. Mr. Danial Creato, Vice-President of RCA Service Co., stated in an inter-
view (Aug. 12, 1952) that, although there were evils caused by unethical or unskilled
dealers, the consequences of subjecting the sellers of service and parts contracts to
statutory insurance regulation would be to deprive the public of a valuable service.
54. Colaizzi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 208 N.Y. 275, 101 N.E. 859 (1913).
55. In a communication to the UNnVRsrTY oF PENxSYLVANIA LAW REvmW from
Luke J. Kavanaugh, Colorado Commissioner of Insurance (Sept. 18, 1952), on file,
Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School, the Commissioner
stated: "I believe that it was not the intention of the Legislature that such petty
merchandising problems should come under regulation by the Insurance Department
of this State. It would be quite outside of our province to attempt to regulate or
police the industry in these myriad matters."
56. Large sums of money are not held over a long period of time as service is
generally required within a year; the nature of the contract limits the rise of evasive
clauses; and there is no third party interest involved.
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independent service contractor should not be allowed to assume this duty
by contracting to replace parts and render services upon the happening of
specified contingencies, excluding external causes, without being regulated
as an insurance company? Of course, it could be argued conceptually that
this contract is not incidental to the service man's business; but there are
public policy and sound business reasons militating against the result of
regulation. Oil burners, electric diswashers, air conditioner units, auto-
mobiles, etc., are highly technical and need frequent attention. A regular
inspection is often necessary for their safe operation. Their lack of mobility
requires the additional cost of having the service man come to the product
rather then the product going to the service man. Many of these articles
have become so essential to the daily pattern of life that quick and ready
service is demanded. By this type of contract the consumer can be as-
sured of immediate, skilled service by personnel who will relieve him of
the responsibility of maintaining the product at its full capacity and use-
fulness.
In addition to policy reasons, there are some legal hooks upon which a
court may hang the desirable result. Unlike typical insurance, there is no
third party interest involved and no large amount of money. A customer
is buying something he is certain to utilize eventually; and the value of that
product, like a tangible product, depends to a great extent upon the re-
liability of the seller or manufacturer. While it is possible for an independ-
ent contractor to become bankrupt owing services, this does not warrant
the complete abolition of this type of serviceY1
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER
Insurance commissioners are faced with a serious problem. If the
commissioner or the attorney general decides that a contingent contract is
insurance, the former with the help of the latter must enforce the insurance
laws. The commissioner then is no longer solely involved in financial
structures of insurance companies. He must apportion rates to the risk,
not only for each class of products but for each individual make of product.
An even more difficult administrative problem is the determination of the
value of the services and parts in relation to the premiums paid. Because
of these apparent administrative difficulties, three questions were posed to
the insurance commissioners in regard to the television service contracts,
with the following results:
57. Mr. Danial Creato, Vice-President of the RCA Service Company, Inc., stated
in an interview (Sept. 20, 1952), that insurance companies had not indicated any
great desire to enter this field, probably because they felt that the cost of com-
plying with the administrative details imposed by the insurance statute could price
such a contract out of the market. In addition, their lack of know-how would in-
crease the cost since they would have to sub-contract the work.
58. All non-confidential communications to the UNIVERsITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAW REVIEW upon this subject are on file at the Biddle Law Library, University of
Pennsylvania Law School.
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(1) Question: If the television service contracts should be held to be
technically insurance, could your staff at its present size do an adequate job
of policing the industry? Out of 34 answers, 14 thought their staff was
adequate and 20 thought it was not adequate.6 0
(2) Question: If the television service contracts should be held to be
technically insurance, is there any public need for their regulation? Out
of 27 answers, 14 thought there was a public need for regulation6' and 13
thought there was no public need for their regulation.
2
(3) Question: If the television service contracts should be held to be
technically insurance, would the administrative cost of incorporating as an
insurance company and complying with the insurance statutes make the
cost of such contracts so expensive that the selling of them would be im-
practical? Out of 27 answers, 18 thought that it would raise the cost so
as to become prohibitive 8 3 and nine thought it would not.64
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The following solutions are offered to the problems raised by risk-
shifting contracts which are used as sales devices or used by an independent
contractor in order to increase his service business. The specific problem
at which they are aimed is television service contracts.
(1) Although there is danger of the public being "gyped" 65 by the
sellers of television service contracts, the same problem exists in the pur-
chase of any merchandise. Since the customer-promisee is buying some-
thing which he is certain to need, the purchase of a service contract is
analogous to the purchase of any tangible product.6 6 In both cases the pur-
chaser is in the same position if the service rendered, by the product or by
59. Cal., Conn., Ill., Iowa, Ky., Md., Mass., Minn., Neb., N.H., N.Y., Okla., Ore.
and W. Va.
60. Ala., Ark., Colo., Ind., La., Mich., Miss., Mo., Nev., N.D., R.I., S.D.,
Vt., and Wis. Six states requested that their answers remain confidential.
61. Ark., Conn. (when a manufacturer does not sell them), Ill., Iowa, Ky.,
Md., Mass., Minn., Miss., N.H., N.Y., Ore. and W. Va. One state requested that
its answer remain confidential.
62. Colo., Ind., Mich., Neb., Nev., S.D., Vt. and Wis. Five states requested
that their answers remain confidential.
63. Ark., Colo., Conn., Ind., La., Md., Neb., Nev., N.H., N.Y., N.D., R.I.,
and Vt. Five states requested that their answers remain confidential.
64. Iowa, Kan., Ky., Mass., Minn., Miss., S.D. and W. Va. One state requested
that its answer remain confidential.
65. See How TV Racketeers Gyp Yon, 60 REAnza's DIGEST 103 (June, 1952).
66. It is not certain that one will have a fire but it is certain one will require
service and replacement of parts, since only a limited number of useful hours can
be built into any mechanical or electronic part. In addition, most television contracts
provide for other seivices which the consumer can utilize, such as inspection and
instruction in operation.
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the service man, is not satisfactory. If the seller of such a contract becomes
insolvent, the service which the promisee has purchased will never be re-
ceived; likewise, in the purchase of a product with a warranty, if the seller
becomes insolvent, the customer will never receive the protection which he
has paid for in the initial sale price. The cost of the warranty is not so
great as the $5 to $75 one-year television service contract, but does the
difference in this amount of money warrant the stringent regulation im-
posed by the insurance statutes? The answer seems clearly no. A better
solution would be to allow the customer to rely upon his own business
acumen with the aid of the Better Business Bureau.
(2) Since the insurance commissioners, under the insurance statutes,
have no discretion in deciding what must be regulated, or, to a large extent,
the degree of regulation, the statutes should be amended to grant discretion
to the commissioner in these borderline cases.
(3) The various trade associations, such as the Radio-Television
Manufacturers' Association, could assume responsibility for the policing of
the industry.
(4) To stimulate more responsibility on the part of the seller of such
a contract, he should be required to post a bond and secure a license.
7
(5) As a last alternative, an established insurance company might
write these contracts, 8 but the statutes could allow the rates, method of
selling, degree of coverage, time of coverage, etc., to be decided solely by
the seller of the contract and the insurance company.
Any of the above solutions would be better then requiring a certain
minimum capital in order to offer this type of contract, since that would
be futile unless rates were controlled. To require a large capital reserve
at all times would make the offering of this type of contract impractical
for all but a few large manufacturing firms.
The issue resolves itself into whether the insurance statutes should
stand in the way of businessmen's attempts to give the American public
what they are demanding. The common sense answer seems to be no.
If regulation is needed it must be done with a lighter hand then the insur-
ance laws permit, or the public demand will go unsatisfied.
67. The licensing requirement was recently advocated by a Philadelphia City
councilman. See The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin Nov. 18, 1952, p. 22, col. 2.
68. After difficulty in getting an insurance company to enter this field, one
service company is now operating under an arrangement in New York, whereby the
insurance company is the promisor, the service company is the promisee, and the
policyholder is the third-party beneficiary. Because of the ruling of the Attorney
General, this arrangement apparently would not be necessary for first year contracts
of the manufacturer or his distributor or dealer.
